We test whether there has been a "Great Moderation" of output volatility at the firm level. The multifactor residual model proposed by Pesaran (2006) is used to isolate the idiosyncratic component of firms' sales growth from macroeconomic developments. This methodology is applied to a balanced panel of about 1,200 German firms covering a 35-year period . Our research has three main findings. First, unconditional firm-level volatility and aggregate output volatility have seen similar downward trends. Second, conditional, idiosyncratic firm-level volatility does not exhibit a downward trend. Third, there is a positive link between growth and volatility at the firm level.
Introduction
With the recent financial crisis, the decline in aggregate output volatility, which characterized many industrialized countries over the past decades (Blanchard and Simon 2001, Stock and Watson 2002) , has come to an abrupt end. At the same time, the causes for the "Great Moderation" are still the subject of lively debate. The jury is still out as to whether "Good Policy", in particular a more stabilizing monetary policy, or "Good Luck", i.e. the absence of major shocks, was the main cause of the Great Moderation.
For individual households, it is the development of volatility at the firm level rather than the development of aggregate volatility that matters. If firm-level volatility increases, households must find ways to diversify firm-level risks in order to shield their consumption against income fluctuations. Diversification opportunities, in turn, depend on the relative importance of macroeconomic and idiosyncratic factors. Idiosyncratic volatility can be diversified in developed financial markets. Macroeconomic volatility, in contrast, can be diversified nationally only if some firms react differently to the same macroeconomic shock.
In this paper, we thus test whether evidence of a "Great Moderation" can be found at the firm level.
1 To date, little consensus has been reached on how firm-level output volatility has evolved over time, let alone on the causes of volatility changes. For the US, Comin and Philippon (2006) show diverging patterns in firm-level and aggregate output volatility. According to their results, firm-level output volatility has increased, whereas aggregate output volatility has decreased (see also Comin and Mulani 2006) . confirm these general patterns and show that output and employment volatility display similar trends. Yet Davis et al. (2006) demonstrate that the finding of an increase in firmlevel output volatility crucially depends on the sample of firms chosen. They find the increase in firm-level volatility to be a feature of large, publicly traded firms. Using information on privately-owned firms as well, Davis et al. (2006) find a downward trend in firm-level volatility for the US, mirroring macroeconomic volatility.
Evidence on firm-level volatility for non-US countries is scarce (Davis and Kahn 2007) . For France, Thesmar and Thoenig (2004) show an upward trend in firm-level volatility. Parker (2007) reports an increase in firm-level output volatility for the UK as well. For Germany, patterns at the firm level are similar to those found in aggregated data, and there is no evidence of an increase in volatility (Buch et al. 2009 ). 2007. 2 For evidence on aggregate volatility in Germany see Aßmann et al. (2006) and Buch et al. (2004) .
In this paper, we argue that inference about trends in firm-level versus aggregate volatility requires to distinguish between idiosyncratic and macroeconomic factors. We go beyond earlier studies by using the multifactor residual model proposed by Pesaran (2006) to isolate the idiosyncratic growth of firms' sales from macroeconomic factors. We apply this methodology to a comprehensive panel dataset for German firms provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank. These data allow us to track individual firms for a maximum of 35 years . We control for observed and unobserved macroeconomic developments that affect all firms while allowing for a heterogeneous response of firms to these factors. Our results show substantial differences between the unconditional volatility of firms' sales growth and the idiosyncratic, conditional volatility.
After isolating the idiosyncratic component of firm-level volatility, we analyze the determinants of firm-level growth volatility. We employ fixed effects panel regressions accounting for sample selection. Additionally, the heteroskedastic regression model proposed by Harvey (1976) is used to estimate the determinants of the residual variance of firms' idiosyncratic sales growth. We find higher asset growth and lower inventory-sales ratios to be associated with a higher volatility of firms' sales. Leverage has no significant impact.
Why would one expect firm-level and aggregate volatility to differ? After all, aggregate growth rates of GDP are the averaged growth rates across all firms in an economy. Yet developments of growth volatility at the aggregate level and at the firm level might differ if output changes are imperfectly correlated across firms (Comin and Phillipon 2006) . Patterns of correlation, in turn, may change due to differences in the process of deregulation across sectors, differences in R&D intensities, or different degrees of goods market competition. Davis et al. (2006) , by contrast, argue that differences in the time series patterns of firm-level and aggregate volatility are unlikely. Volatility at different levels of aggregation should move in the same direction if the shares of firms in aggregate output and the responses of firms to macroeconomic developments remain relatively stable.
We find that trends in unconditional firm-level and aggregate volatility are similar, in the full sample and in a balanced panel including only surviving firms, supporting Davis et al. (2006) . Controlling for macroeconomic developments, we find that firm-level volatility exhibits no downward trend. In fact, there even is some evidence of a very slow increase in idiosyncratic firm-level volatility, supporting Comin and Phillipon (2006) .
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Part 2, we provide a brief theoretical background. In Parts 3 and 4, we describe our data and our empirical model. In Part 5, we use this model to decompose firms' growth rates into the idiosyncratic component and the component driven by macroeconomic factors, and we analyze the determinants of firm-level growth volatility. Part 6 concludes.
Theoretical Background
In order to understand how firm-level and aggregate volatility develop -and why time trends might differ -a theoretical framework which departs from the assumption of symmetric, homogenous firms is required. Using a standard DixitStiglitz-type specification of household preferences, firm-level prices and output can be shown to depend on firm-level and macroeconomic factors. The first-order condition for the optimal pricing strategy of the supplier of good i is then given by (Woodford 2003 ξ is a vector of firm-specific disturbances. According to equation (1), a firm's profit maximum depends on firm-specific, industry-specific, and macroeconomic developments. These variables also have an impact on the volatility of firm-level variables. Equation (1) also implies that trends in the volatility of firm-specific and macroeconomic factors might differ if t ξ and it ξ exhibit different time trends or if the propagation channels between micro-and macroeconomic developments change systematically over time. We can think of four main reasons why volatility may change over time. First, financial market deregulation and integration may provide better risk-sharing possibilities for investors. Hence, ceteris paribus, more risky firms may be able to obtain external finance, thus raising the average risk and volatility of firms. Thesmar and Thoenig (2004) find evidence for France in support of the hypothesis that financial market deregulation has contributed to an increase in firm-level output volatility.
Second, greater exposure to international competition and the deregulation of product markets may increase the elasticity of demand that firms are facing. This could change the responsiveness of firms to a given shock. Third, changes in the process of productivity growth away from the imitation of existing technologies towards innovative research and development may increase volatility. Eichengreen (2007) , for instance, notes that, up until roughly the 1970s, growth in Europe was characterized by a catching up process to the technological frontier whereas, in later decades, innovative R&D started to dominate.
Fourth, from a theoretical point of view, inventories are used to smooth production when demand shocks dominate (Hornstein 1998) . If productivity shocks dominate, in contrast, inventories are used to stabilize sales. New information technologies, in turn, may have helped firms to improve their inventory management. During the "Great Moderation", output volatility fell further than final sales volatility (Davis and Kahn 2007) . This implies a change in the behavior of inventories and/or a change in the covariance between inventories and sales.
Our data are not rich enough to study the importance of all of these factors. However, we will show trends in the data and model the determinants of volatility as closely as possible to the above hypotheses.
Data and Descriptive Statistics

T h e D a t a
To document long-run trends in firm-level volatility, we exploit a new firm-level dataset that links the Deutsche Bundesbank's Corporate Balance Sheet Statistics (Unternehmensbilanzstatistik), which covers the period from 1971 to 1996, and the Financial Statements Data Pool (Jahresabschlussdatenpool), which starts in 1997 (Deutsche Bundesbank , 2006 . Both data sets can be used for statistical purposes, but only under strict confidentiality on-site at the Deutsche Bundesbank. The data have been anonymized, and only Bundesbank staff is allowed to work with the Financial Statements Data Pool.
Our data cover 35 years . The unit of observation is the individual firm. Generally, our dataset contains information on all balance sheet items and financial statements. We use the following firm-level variables:
o (Real) sales: Like Comin and Philippon (2006) and Davis et al. (2006) , we use real sales as a proxy for firm-level output. For this variable, we have relatively few data losses owing to incomplete and inconsistent reporting. Lacking information on firm-level prices, we convert nominal variables into real variables by deflating each firm's sales with the industry-level price index obtained from the EU KLEMS database (see www.euklems.net) and taking the difference of the logarithm of real sales. o Assets: A firm's assets, deflated with the same price index as sales, are used as a proxy for firm size. Total assets are a stock measure of firm size, which is likely to fluctuate less over time than sales as a flow measure.
o Inventories: The inventory-sales ratio captures possible effects of technological changes on the volatility of firms' sales. This also takes into account that sales are an imperfect proxy of output if inventories change. o Leverage: We compute leverage as a firm's debt divided by its total equity.
Leverage could be interpreted as a measure of credit market friction. From a theoretical point of view, we expect that more severe financial frictions reduce growth and increase the volatility of investment (Aghion and Banerjee 2005) . Accordingly, the expected sign of leverage is negative. Our dataset contains information on about 80,000 firms per year for the 1971-2005 period. On the whole, our full dataset can be considered quite representative for the German economy as it represents about 54% of total turnover as reported by the turnover tax statistics (Deutsche Bundesbank 2008) . Also, the growth rates of the total sales and of aggregate GDP show a very similar development.
We create two panels. The first is an unbalanced panel including all firms which report on sales for a minimum of 11 consecutive years. The second is a balanced panel of firms surviving over the complete observation period of 35 years and reporting on all balance sheet items which are used in the estimations. Our main empirical method requires time series regressions for each individual firm and can thus be applied only to the balanced panel (see Section 4). We use the unbalanced panel to check whether the time series patterns for volatility in the balanced panel are representative for the German economy as a whole. The balanced panel includes 1,183 firms or 41,405 firm-year observations. 4 Table 1a shows the descriptive statistics.
Our dataset contains information on manufacturing and services firms. This makes our findings robust to structural changes (see, e.g., Parker 2007 ). The disadvantage is that the inflow of younger and presumably riskier firms into the sample and the exit of high-volatility firms are not captured. In addition to standard volatility measures used in the literature, we thus compute a modified volatility measure suggested by Davis et al. (2006) to accommodate entry and exit of firms (Section 3.2).
Computing Firm-Level Volatility
As a first step towards computing firm-level volatility, we compute firms' growth rates. Since our data contain no information on reasons for large outliers such as mergers and acquisitions, we drop observations which fall by more than one half or more than double.
5 Moreover, firms with negative equity are excluded.
4 A detailed comparison of the balanced and the full data set is given in the working paper version of this paper. (See Buch, Döpke, and Stahn (2008) for details.) 5 The same restriction is applied to the growth rates of assets. 
Graph 1: Unconditional Firm-Level Versus Aggregate Volatility
This graph plots the median unconditional firm-level output volatility and the aggregate (GDP) output volatility. Both have been computed as the standard deviation of growth rates over a moving five-and ten-year window, respectively.
Graph 1 plots the median of the unconditional 6 firm-level volatility of sales growth against the volatility of GDP growth. 7 We compare descriptive statistics for the unconditional volatility in the balanced and the unbalanced panel, and we also compare the volatilities using 5-and 10-year rolling windows to compute volatilities.
Graph 1 shows that time trends in aggregate and firm-level data are similar. Volatility has declined over time, and this decline has been interrupted by the period following German unification in the early 1990s. The increase in firmlevel volatility around unification has been greater for the unbalanced panel, which contains shorter-lived firms, than for the balanced panel, which contains only the stable, long-lived firms. Since patterns in the data are similar for the 5-year and 10-year rolling window, we follow earlier literature and use the 10-year window in the remainder of this paper Philippon 2006, Davis et al. 2006) .
Over the complete observation period, the median 10-year standard deviation of firm-level growth in the unbalanced panel declined from 0.135 in 1976 to 0.118 in 2000. Firm-level volatility was on average about eight times higher than the volatility of GDP. A direct comparison between the balanced and unbalanced panels shows that -unsurprisingly -the balanced panel includes the more stable firms. Hence, the median 10-years volatility averaged about 0.105 for the balanced panel compared to 0.125 for the unbalanced panel. However, the time trends are very similar.
A comparison with US evidence shows very similar numbers. In Comin and Philippon (2006) , median firm-level volatility ranges from 0.096 in 1955 to 0.207 in the year 2000, and similar values are presented in Davis et al. (2006) . The overall time trends are a bit different for Germany and the US though, mainly because of the increase in volatility in the early 1990s following German unification. Also, GDP volatility in Germany has declined between the mid-1970s and mid-1980s, whereas in the US, it has increased slightly in this period (cf. Graph 1 in Comin and Philippon (2006) ).
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The unbalanced panel used so far includes only firms with data for at least 10 consecutive years. Very short-lived firms are not included. As a further check on whether time trends in the balanced panel are representative for German firms as a whole, we have computed the modified volatility measure proposed in Davis et al. (2006) . (Result are not reported but are available upon request.) The advantage of this measure is that it allows us to account for firm entry and exit. This measure yields a higher volatility than for the other panels (0.154 on average), which reflects the impact of entry and exit. However, the time pattern in the modified volatility measure is very similar to that of the other panels. Modified volatility declined substantially in the 1970s. Since the modified volatility measure does not require 10-year time strings, we can also compute this measure for the early 1970s and the 2000s. In the 2000s, firm-level volatility trended upward.
To sum up, this section shows that firm-level volatility in Germany has exhibited similar trends as the volatility of aggregate GDP during the past three decades. While overall volatility trends are a bit different than in the US -mainly because the Great Moderation in output volatility in Germany was interrupted by the unification period -this parallel evolution of firm-level and aggregate volatility resembles the stylized facts reported in Davis et al. (2006) .
The unconditional volatilities presented so far, however, say little about the volatility of the idiosyncratic components of firms' growth. In the following, we will therefore describe the methodology used to isolate microeconomic factors from macroeconomic factors affecting firm-level volatility.
Computing Idiosyncratic Firm-Level Volatility
Previous empirical work on firm-level volatility uses the unconditional volatility of output. However, the unconditional firm-level volatility does not allow us to distinguish between idiosyncratic, firm-level factors and macroeconomic factors. The parallel evolution of firm-level and aggregate volatility documented in Graph 1 could be the result of similar developments at different levels of aggregation, but it could also cloud diverging patterns at the firm level. Extracting the macroeconomic component by regressing volatility on observable macroeconomic factors may not fully isolate the idiosyncratic component because only observed factors are included. Also, in a pooled regression, the impact of macroeconomic factors is assumed to be homogenous across firms.
Hence, in this section, we describe the multifactor residual model recently proposed by Pesaran (2006) . This model allows observed and unobserved macroeconomic factors to be filtered out of firm-level data. It provides a measure of conditional, idiosyncratic firm-level real sales growth. To see the logic of the multifactor residual model, assume that firm-level sales growth is given by: 
where t f i s a n 1 × m vector of unobserved macroeconomic factors, and it u is the firm-specific (idiosyncratic) error, which is assumed to be distributed independently of t d and it x . In Pesaran (2006) , the observed and unobserved factors t d a n d t f a r e a s s u m e d t o b e c o v a r i a n c e s t a t i o n a r y . G e n e r a l l y , t h e unobserved factors can be correlated with ( t d , it x ), and the firm-specific regressors are modeled according to: The key challenge is to isolate developments at the firm level from aggregate developments while allowing for the fact that some of the macroeconomic factors are unobserved. We thus isolate the impact of factors which affect all firms' sales growth ( t d , t f ) from the impact of those firmspecific variables which are independent of the macroeconomic factors, i.e. the residual of equation (4) ( it v ). We perform this decomposition in two steps. In a first step, we run timeseries regressions for sales growth of each firm in the sample on observed and unobserved macroeconomic factors. Following Pesaran (2006) , the unobserved macroeconomic factors can be proxied through the cross-section means of firmspecific variables. We therefore take advantage of the fact that the model described by equations (2)-(4) is quite general as it allows the unobserved common factors t f to be correlated with the individual-specific regressors it x via a multifactor structure with heterogeneous factor loadings over the cross-section units. We run these regressions for each of the firms in our balanced panel and for each firm-level variable separately, and we retain the residuals from these regressions.
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In a second step, we use the squared residuals from these time series regressions, which are the growth rates of firm-level variables corrected for the impact of observed and unobserved macroeconomic factors, in a pooled firmlevel panel regression: Note that the individual-specific coefficients are consistently estimated. They are also asymptotically unbiased for ∞ → N for both T fixed and ∞ → T as long as the rank condition concerning the factor loadings is satisfied (Pesaran 2006) . fixed effects, and it v i s a s e t o f f i r m -s p e c i f i c r e g r e s s o r s . T h o s e a r e t h e f i r s t -s t a g e residuals from equation (4), i.e. they are also corrected for the influence of observed and unobserved macroeconomic factors. We use time fixed effects as a general specification of the time trend as well as a linear time trend. The time trend also captures the fact that firm-level volatility is related to firm age. Typically, older and more established firms are less volatile than younger firms. This should lead to a negative impact of the time trend on volatility; however, the trend naturally also captures other factors that vary systematically over time.
To check whether there is a time trend in conditional firm-level volatility, we also use graphical as well as regression-based evidence. In addition, we use fixed-effects panel regressions and the heteroskedastic regression model suggested by Harvey (1976) to analyze the determinants of idiosyncratic firmlevel volatility.
Decomposing and Explaining Firm-Level Volatility
Results for the unconditional volatility of firm-level sales growth reported in Graph 1 provide evidence of a decline in firm-level volatility. This largely resembles the fall in macroeconomic volatility. To what extent does this decline in firm-level volatility result from lower volatility at the macro level, and to what extent does it reflect smaller idiosyncratic volatility? In this section, we report the results of the first-and second-stage regressions described above.
F i r s t -S t a g e R e g r e s s i o n : D e c o m p o s i n g F i r m -L e v e l V o l a t i l i t y
The goal of the first-stage regressions is to correct the growth of firm-level variables of observed and unobserved macroeconomic factors. Our set of observed macroeconomic factors includes domestic and foreign variables as well as price and quantity measures. To capture the domestic macroeconomic environment, we include the growth rate of domestic absorption, 10 short-term interest rates, and domestic inflation. To capture the international macroeconomic environment, we include the annual changes in the real exchange rate, world demand, and raw material prices. (Details on the data definitions are given in the Appendix; see also Table 1a.) We use four means of firm-specific variables as proxies for unobserved macroeconomic factors. The mean growth rate of firms' sales captures structural shifts in firm-level growth. The growth rate of firms' assets captures changes in the size structure of firms. The mean inventory-sales ratio captures changes in the 10 Domestic absorption is defined as the sum of domestic private and government consumption and investment.
importance of inventories due to technological progress, and mean leverage across firms captures changing financial conditions. The inventory-sales ratio shows a downward trend over time, reflecting improvements in inventory management. Leverage, in contrast, increases until the early 1990s, and fell subsequently, reflecting legislative changes affecting the financing of firms in Germany as well as the increase in stock market valuation during the 1990s. Table 1b shows the correlations between the observed macro factors and the unobserved factors. All correlations are below 0.9, and most are below 0.5. We find the highest correlations between the growth rate of domestic absorption and between some firm-level variables. However, we include a full set of observed and unobserved macro-factors as these may still pick up some orthogonal component of the macroeconomic environment.
The advantage of running the first-stage regressions firm-by-firm is that we allow for maximum heterogeneity across firms. The partial R²s for these factors show that, on average, the macroeconomic factors individually explain about 5%-8% of the variance in sales growth across firms (see Table 1c ). However, the explanatory power varies widely, with the highest partial R²s being in the range of 0.58 for the real exchange rate and 0.61 for raw materials prices. Hence, for some of the firms in the sample, individual macroeconomic factors explain more than 50% of the variance in real sales over time. To show how firms react to macroeconomic factors, we also regress the firm-level coefficients obtained from the time series regressions on a set of dummy variables. We weight each observation with the inverse of its standard deviation. Results reported in Table 2 show some differences in the response of sales growth to macroeconomic factors. Larger firms' sales growth responds more strongly to changes in world demand and in the real exchange rate. Moreover, manufacturing firms' sales growth responds more strongly than other sectors' sales growth to world demand. These findings might be explained by large firms and manufacturing firms' stronger orientation toward international markets. Furthermore, services firms' sales growth, due to a lesser dependence on imported commodities, responds less strongly to changes in raw materials prices. Listed firms, by contrast, do not differ significantly from the rest of the sample. The plots of the residual standard deviations are the most interesting outcome of the first-stage regressions. Graph 2 shows the conditional volatility of firms' sales growth. Two observations immediately meet the eye.
Graph 2: Conditional versus Unconditional Firm-Level Volatility
This Graph compares the median unconditional firm-level output volatility and the median conditional firm-level output volatility, computed over a moving ten-year window.
First, the conditional firm-level volatility is substantially lower than the unconditional volatility. During the turbulent 1970s, macroeconomic factors accounted for more than 50% of the volatility of firm-level sales growth. In subsequent periods, the importance of macroeconomic factors has been less pronounced, but the gap between the conditional and the unconditional volatility series has remained substantial.
Second, the downward trend in unconditional firm-level volatility reported in Graph 1 is not visible once macroeconomic factors are taken into consideration. Instead, the time profile of conditional firm-level volatility is rather flat and even shows a slight upward trend. In this sense, our results confirm the conclusion reached by Davis et al. (2006) conditional volatility are also consistent with Comin and Philippon (2006) who argue that the time trends of aggregate and firm-level volatility differ.
Graph 3: Conditional Firm-Level Volatility -Sample Splits
This graph plots the median conditional firm-level output volatility over a moving ten-year window for different sub-samples of firms.
We also explore whether time trends in conditional volatility differ across firms (Graph 3). Davis et al. (2006) show, for instance, that volatility for listed but not for unlisted firms has increased in the US. We find evidence, in fact, of an increase in conditional volatility for listed but not for unlisted firms. While listed firms start with a below-average volatility in the 1970s, their volatility had converged to the median across firms by the late 1990s. Moreover, the difference between listed and unlisted firms does not simply reflect the impact of firm size. Splitting the sample into small and large firms yields quite similar time trends. Small firms exhibit higher conditional volatility than large firms, but the trends have been quite parallel. Moreover, large firms and manufacturing firms show similar time patterns and levels of conditional volatility (at least until the 1990s).
S e c o n d -S t a g e R e g r e s s i o n s : E x p l a i n i n g t h e V o l a t i l i t y o f S a l e s G r o w t h
Which firm-specific factors determine the volatility of growth at the firm level? Do size effects matter? Do we find support for different hypotheses on the causes of the Great Moderation at the firm level? These are questions we will now turn to.
In Table 3 , we report results of firm-level regressions using the squared residuals of the first-stage regressions as a measure of the volatility of the conditional firm-level growth rates of sales as a dependent variable (cf. equation (5)). We use fixed-effects panel regressions with robust standard errors. In contrast to the first-stage regressions, we now estimate homogenous coefficients.
These regressions are run on the balanced panel, and we account for sample selection using the method proposed by Heckman (1976) . The selection equation is a probit model. It shows which firm-specific characteristics contribute to the fact that a firm is included in the balanced panel. The regressors are contemporaneous firm-specific variables. Since we have a panel dataset, we include the means of the firm-specific variables in the model to account for the impact of time-invariant firm-specific characteristics.
11 T h e r e s i d u a l s o f t h i s probit model are used to compute the Mills ratio. The outcome equation is a panel fixed-effects regression, which explains the conditional firm-level volatility by firm-specific variables. To this equation, we add the inverse of the Mills ratio as a regressor to account for sample selection (see Column (2) in Table 3 ).
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The selection equation shows that large firms, firms with lower sales growth, firms with low leverage, and listed firms are more likely to be included in the balanced panel. These results are consistent with prior expectations that the balanced panel is dominated by the larger, established, and more stable firms.
The inverse Mills ratio is significant in the regression that explains the conditional firm-level volatility. Hence, the selection equation and the outcome equation are significantly correlated. Nonetheless, this selection effect does not affect the main qualitative results of our analysis. Column (3) in Table 3 shows results that do not account for the selection bias, which are very similar to the results using the Heckman procedure. Notes: In Column (1), the selection equation, the dependent variable is a 0/1 dummy for a firm belonging to the balanced panel. In Columns (2) and (3), the outcome equation, the dependent variable is the conditional firm-level volatility, i.e. the squared residual of a time series regression of firm-level real sales growth on macroeconomic factors. Asset growth, the inventory-sales ratio, and leverage are conditional on macroeconomic factors. "Year" denotes a linear time trend and "unification" a dummy variable which takes the value of one from 1991 to 1995 and zero otherwise. In Column (2), results are corrected for sample selection by including the inverse Mills ratio obtained from the selection equation. Columns (2) and (3) are fixed-effects panel estimations with robust standard errors. The selection equation includes a full set of 0/1 dummy variables for legal status, year, and sector fixed effects; the outcome equation includes dummies for legal status and sector fixed effects. ***, **, * = significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.
Generally, our model explains less than 5% of the variation in the volatility of sales growth across firms. This does not come as a surprise since the results are driven by a large degree of cross-sectional heterogeneity, which is typical for large micro-datasets like the one at hand. (Gorbachev (2007) , for instance, analyzes the determinants of household-level consumption risk for the US and reports R²s in a similar range.)
We find that faster-growing firms have a higher volatility. The estimated coefficient of 0.032 is very robust across different specifications. The impact of asset growth on the conditional volatility builds up gradually over time. The first lag of asset growth is positive and significant throughout with a coefficient estimate of 0.015.
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The finding that faster-growing firms also have more volatile idiosyncratic sales growth is consistent with earlier findings at the firm level or industry level concerning the growth-volatility nexus. Imbs (2007) finds a positive correlation between growth and volatility at the industry-level and a negative correlation at the aggregate level due to imperfect correlation of growth rates across sectors. Our firm-level data suggest a similar positive relationship.
Firms with a higher inventory-sales ratio have a lower conditional volatility of real sales. The coefficient is -0.048. At first glance, the negative coefficient on inventories seems to contradict the hypothesis that improved inventory management helps firms to reduce the volatility of sales. The results are consistent, though, with inventories serving as a buffer against productivity shocks. According to this interpretation, higher inventory-sales ratios smooth the impact of volatile production on sales.
A linear time trend is significant but relatively small, thus indicating only a relatively slow increase in volatility.
14 In contrast to unconditional firm-level volatility and aggregate volatility, the idiosyncratic volatility of firms has thus been on a slow trend rise. In unreported regressions, we also interact the time trend with a dummy variable for listed firms to analyze whether firm-level volatility has increased because of an upward trend in the volatility of large, publicly listed firms (Davis et al. 2006) . This interaction term is positive and significant, confirming the graphical evidence presented above (see Graph 1).
By contrast, leverage as a measure of financial factors and the unification dummy are insignificant. Although Graph 1 has shown that dynamics of firmlevel and aggregate volatility differed in the post-unification period, the macroeconomic factors have already filtered out the impact of the unification process on conditional volatility.
Robustness
To check whether our results are driven by a particular group of firms, we split the sample into small and large, listed and unlisted, and manufacturing and services firms. Unreported fixed-effects regressions show that the qualitative results for the control variables are not affected.
Alternatively, we also use a regression model with multiplicative heteroskedasticity as proposed by Harvey (1976) . The advantage of this model is that we can simultaneously specify a "mean" equation -explaining the growth of sales -as well as a "variance" equation -explaining the residual variance of the mean equation. The heteroskedastic regression model has, to the best of our knowledge, not been applied to an analysis of firm-level volatility so far. Our main interest is in the variance equation. 15 We use the same firm-specific regressors as for the fixed effects estimations before, but we now include dummies for the different types of firms (large versus small, listed versus unlisted) in lieu of a full set of firm fixed effects. Results are reported in Table 4 . Results for the variance equation confirm the positive impact of higher asset growth and the time trend as well as the negative impact of the inventory-sales ratio. The firm size dummy is negative and significant.
Summary and Conclusions
This paper has tested whether evidence of a "Great Moderation" can be found in German firm-level data. To answer this question, we have used a unique firmlevel dataset which allows a large sample of German firms to be tracked across 35 years. Our paper has three main findings. First, unconditional firm-level volatility and aggregate volatility have developed similarly. This confirms findings for the US by Davis et al. (2006) and differs from Comin and Philippon (2005) , who find diverging trends of firm-level and aggregate volatility. Time patterns are similar for a balanced panel using only surviving firms and an unbalanced panel using firms which have been in the sample for at least ten years. This table reports the results of the heteroskedastic regression model proposed by Harvey (1976) . The dependent variable of the mean equation is the mean idiosyncratic real sales growth across all firms. The variance equation explains the residual variance of the mean equation. "Year" denotes a linear time trend and "unification" a dummy variable which takes the value of one from 1991 to 1995 and zero otherwise. ***, **, * = significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.
Second, inference about the evolution of firm-level volatility requires us to take into account macroeconomic factors. Using the multifactor panel model proposed by Pesaran (2006) , we have decomposed firm-level sales growth and volatility into an idiosyncratic component and a component driven by observed and unobserved macroeconomic developments. Results from this disaggregation show that the overall time trends in unconditional firm-level volatility are driven by macroeconomic factors. Once we take this into account and extract the idiosyncratic component of firm-level volatility, we not only find volatility to be lower but also to exhibit a flat and, if anything, slightly increasing pattern.
Third, we have used different panel models to analyze the determinants of the idiosyncratic component of firm-level volatility. Our results take the bias arising from firm selection into the panel of surviving firms into account. We find that faster-growing firms have more volatile real sales growth. Larger inventorysales ratios lower volatility. The time trend in firm-level volatility has been positive. As for the US, there has been a positive time trend for the volatility of listed firms.
Overall, our results show the importance of a stable macroeconomic environment for firm-level stability. High macroeconomic volatility such as was observed during the 1970s has roughly doubled firm-level volatility. In later periods, the decline in firm-level volatility was driven largely by the decline in macroeconomic volatility. To the extent that "Good Policy" is behind the decline in aggregate volatility, this has also contributed to lower volatility at the firm level.
Our findings also have implications for the potential to diversify risks across German firms. Whereas a substantial part of volatility at the firm level is driven by common macroeconomic factors, which limits the diversification potential across domestic firms, the relative importance of idiosyncratic risks has increased over time. uses observations ranging from t = -2 to t = +2. To accommodate the fact that firms enter and exit the market, we also compute a modified firm-level volatility statistic as in Davis et al. (2006) .
Asset growth: Annual growth rate of a firm's total real assets.
Inventory-sales ratio: Ratio of a firm's inventory over total sales.
